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Abstract
This article examines the ways in which Turkish 
market economy has evolved into a hybrid form 
marked by illiberal characteristics. Exploring the 
dynamics of continuity and change in terms of 
institutional configurations, the article analyzes 
some of the major tensions between the old and 
new institutions in this emerging market economy 
which has attained remarkable levels of growth 
within the last decade even in the context of the 
ongoing global crisis.  It draws comparisons between 
Turkey and Brazil regarding the emergence of 
hybrid varieties of capitalism in the transition from 
state-led development to market opening processes. 
The article asserts that compared to its Brazilian 
counterpart, the Turkish market economy is closer 
to patrimonial and statist market economies, rather 
than the liberal ones, and almost constantly goes 
through a vacillation between institutionalization 
and de-institutionalization.  
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Resumo
Este artigo examina as maneiras em que a 
economia de mercado turca evoluiu para uma 
forma híbrida marcado por características não-
liberais. Explorando a dinâmica de continuidade 
e mudança em termos de configurações 
institucionais, o artigo analisa algumas das 
principais tensões entre as instituições antigas e 
novas nesta economia de mercado emergente, 
que atingiu níveis notáveis  de crescimento na 
última década, mesmo no contexto do curso 
de crise global. Estabelece comparações entre 
a Turquia e o Brasil sobre o surgimento de 
variedades híbridas de capitalismo na transição 
do desenvolvimento liderado pelo Estado aos 
processos de abertura de mercado. O artigo 
afirma que, comparado com o seu homólogo 
brasileiro, a economia de mercado turca é mais 
próxima de economias de mercado patrimoniais 
e estatista, mais do que os liberais, e quase que 
constantemente passa por uma vacilação entre 
institucionalização e desinstitucionalização.
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Introduction 
Turkish market economy and its evolution in the last few decades can be characterized by the coexistence of continuity and change. The interactions 
between the old and the new along with the dynamics of transition have given rise to a 
combination of varieties of capitalism in this emerging country with daring aspirations 
to be placed in the first league soon. Despite the institutional changes and substantial 
reforms recently introduced into varying policy areas, some patterns of governance 
inherited from the “old regime” still prevail. Embarking upon a hybrid form, the Turkish 
market economy has a generally illiberal character and it can be situated between 
patrimonial, statist and hierarchical varieties of capitalism construed for emerging 
countries (Becker 2011, Schneider 2009). These varieties deviate considerably from 
the two major categories offered by Hall and Soskice (2001), namely liberal and 
coordinated market economies. The following sections will examine the processes 
through which Turkish market economy has adopted its hybrid form by focusing on 
several dimensions such as corporate governance and state-capital relations; state-
labor relations; social policy; and privatization. This study will examine some of the 
significant transformations which have taken place in these dimensions throughout 
the multifaceted market transitions since the 1980s. 
Although the study mainly draws on Turkey, it also aims to situate Turkey within 
the group of emerging countries, more importantly the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India 
and China), with respect to the configuration of market economies. Amongst the 
emerging countries, Turkish market economy displays striking similarities with that of 
Brazil particularly regarding its relatively longer capitalistic experience marked with 
state-led development strategies as well as market transitions still maneuvered by 
the respective states (Boschi and Santana 2012). This study, then, carries out some 
comparisons between Turkey and Brazil, two emerging countries considered to play 
leadership roles in their respective regions in the context of an ongoing global crisis 
which triggered burgeoning trajectories for multipolar globalization. Both countries 
have experienced a noteworthy economic growth as well as political stability 
within the last decade, enabling them to make claims about wide-ranging global 
issues beyond the scope of their respective hinterlands. Despite their ideological 
differences, the incumbents in both countries have vacillated between embracing 
globalization and confronting it-particularly regarding power asymmetries embedded 
in the international and regional organizations. Tackling the initial skepticism of the 
international organizations and the investors alike, the leaders elected to embark 
upon incumbency in 2002, namely Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, 
have signaled the international and domestic players that they would conform with 
the rules of the ongoing globalization process and their identities as a union leader 
and a former disciple of pro-Islamist movements respectively would not thwart their 
commitment for further integrating their countries to the global markets. In spite of 
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such unanticipated conformity with the prevalent rules of global integration, they 
both have not evaded posing bold challenges against some of those rules, which, in 
fact, increased their popularity further not only at home, but also in their respective 
regions. 
Swinging in a pendulum as a developing country being involved in some of the 
major clubs of the advanced countries, such as the OECD, Turkey is now considered an 
upper-middle-income country, one of the G-20, with a fairly developed industrial base, 
akin to the BRICs. Following a belated “lost decade” in the 1990s, the Turkish economy 
has had a striking performance in the first decade of the 21st century. Institutional 
reforms mostly undertaken in the aftermath of the 2000-2001 economic crises have 
played an important role in facilitating the recent performance and relative resilience 
of the economy to the current global crisis. By attaining an annual growth rate of 
7.2% between 2002 and 2007, the GDP reached $735 billion, making Turkey the 16th 
largest economy in the world.1 Ranking the sixth largest in Europe, Turkish economy 
is only situated in the ranks of upper-middle-income countries with a GDP per capita 
of $10,094, while that of Brazil is $10,710 (2010 figures).2 Chart 1 below displays the 
income levels in selected emerging countries, while Chart 2 demonstrates almost 
parallel changes in those levels in Turkey and Brazil since 1960. 
Despite the drastic changes which have taken place since the 1980s, market 
economies in the emerging countries, including those of Brazil and Turkey, are fairly 
different from those of the advanced countries. In their canonical study on varieties of 
capitalism, Hall and Soskice (2001:19) construct two varieties: liberal market economies 
where market mechanisms maintain coordination in financial and industrial relations, 
and coordinated market economies where non-market coordination prevails. In this 

























































Chart 1. GDP Per Capita, Selected Emerging Countries (USD, 2010)
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank











with France, Italy, Portugal and Greece are considered to have ambiguous positions, 
yet clustered into “Mediterranean” variety where different forms of non-market 
coordination prevail in the existence of extensive state intervention and a large agrarian 
sector. In an effort to disaggregate this fuzzy category of Mediterranean, this study 
asserts that Turkish variety of capitalism can be analyzed through the tools offered by a 
newly emerging wave of literature on the varieties of capitalism in emerging countries 
(Becker 2011, Boschi and Santana 2012). 
Among the BRICS, Turkish variety of capitalism is closer to that of Brazil. As Becker 
(2011: 10) argues, “patrimonialism penetrates capitalism strongly in all emerging 
political economies” and Turkey and Brazil are no exceptions in that albeit in varying 
extents. Becker (2011:11-12) delineates patrimonial variety by the significant role of 
political leadership and prevalence of patron-client relationships between the state 
and the market, while he conceptualizes statism as the state’s dominant role over the 
economy where market regulation is restricted by political regulation, and hierarchical 
organization of firms coexists with limited worker rights. In terms of its institutional 
constellations particularly regarding the state’s complex impact on the market players 
and mechanisms as well as maintained political control over the market forces, 
Turkish market economy can be situated between patrimonial and statist varieties of 
Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank
Chart 2. GDP per capita in Turkey and Brazil, 1960-2010 (USD) 
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capitalism. Brazilian market economy also has a hybrid character, but it also entails 
certain characteristics of liberal market economy, in addition to patrimonial and statist 
types (Boschi 2011). Despite transformations taking place in Turkey since the 1980s, 
most important of which being the state’s diminishing role in economic activities, 
some of the former patterns such as the prevalence of clientelistic networks and 
widespread patronage distribution are preserved (Birtek and Toprak 2011, Güneş-
Ayata 1994, Roniger 2004, Stokes 2009). Hence, market liberalization coexists with old 
institutions and norms, while the former is often molded by the latter and the Turkish 
market economy mostly sustains illiberal and hierarchical character (Levi-Faur 2011, 
Schneider 2009). 
Turkey and Brazil: candidates for the most-similar-cases-
analysis?
Resemblance between Turkey and Brazil is not limited to income levels across 
time, but also entails parallel processes and almost simultaneous transitions marked 
by significant ruptures and continuities. For instance, the military played a substantial 
role not only in politics in both cases, but also in the respective markets along with 
development strategies and market transitions. It became a major economic actor 
in both countries through investing in various sectors and engaging in complex 
transactions with broad range of economic actors. Despite democratization which 
entailed the military’s retreat from politics in its essence, the military’s role in the 
market has been mostly retained as a “sticky legacy” in both Turkey and Brazil.
In both countries, the military interventions created significant ruptures which have 
given rise to major changes in institutions and policies. Contrary to Brazil’s long-lasted 
military rule (1964-1985), there were four relatively-short-lived interventions in Turkey 
(1960-61, 1971, 1980-83, 1997). These interventions undertaken during severe fiscal 
and balance of payments crises brought about strict measures for macroeconomic 
stabilization—at least initially. More importantly, they provided available grounds for 
common use of extra-constitutional and executive decrees. Hence, one of the most 
important legacies of these ruptures is the power of the executive which has been 
even enhanced following the end of the military rule, since it was institutionalized by 
the 1982 Constitution in Turkey, and 1988 Constitution in Brazil. Although Turkey has 
a parliamentary system, the widespread use of executive discretion which has further 
intensified in recent years has brought about a system which nearly hosts de-facto 
presidentialism as further explained below. 
As two middle-income countries which have fairly developed industrial bases, 
Turkey and Brazil went through almost simultaneous junctures throughout the 
twentieth century with respect to their development strategies and transitions. After 
having implemented import substitution industrialization strategy (ISI) for about 
five decades, in the 1980s these two countries began to open up coupled with the 
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process of re-democratization. Like Brazil, Turkish experience with the ISI also included 
temporary attempts to open-up starting from the late 1950s. In fact, akin to other mid-
income countries with large domestic markets, Brazil and Turkey had considerable 
success with the ISI strategy in the 1960s and early 1970s on varying levels. Although 
the “success” of the ISI strategy in Turkey was not as impressive as in Brazilian “economic 
miracle” (1968-1978) in the context of the Second National Plan of Development (1974-
1979) due to the earlier emergence of foreign exchange-cum-debt crisis in Turkey 
right after the first oil crisis in 1973, the second phase of the ISI which entailed heavy 
industries had already been launched in both countries by the 1970s (Barkey 1990, 
Bresser-Pereira 1990). Both countries plunged into severe debt crises starting from the 
1970s, similar to many developing countries in the context of increasing liquidity in the 
1970s, followed by increasing interest rates. 
In the aftermath of these crises, Turkey launched a thorough market reform 
program in 1980, making the country one of the forerunners of the market reform 
process. Brazil’s program was initiated in 1985 and broad range of market reforms 
including stabilization, liberalization and privatization have been implemented in both 
countries with differing levels of effectiveness in different time periods. In both cases, 
the market transitions were implemented under the auspices of the international 
financial institutions (IFIs) and both received hefty IFI loans in different time periods. 
In addition to bowing to the overall pressure of globalization to open up, Turkey 
and Brazil also made simultaneous commitments to major regional trade blocs: the 
MERCOSUR in the case of Brazil (1991) and the Customs Union Agreement with the 
European Union in the case of Turkey (1995). 
In both countries, domestic industry was nurtured by the state within the context 
of a state-led development strategy originally initiated in the 1930s coinciding 
with the formation of major state institutions in the context of Vargas’ and Atatürk’s 
increasingly authoritarian regimes entailing various elements of corporatism, 
populism and cooptation under the banner of intensifying nationalism. State’s 
increasing interventionism in domestic markets began in this period coinciding 
with the establishment of the Estado Novo in Brazil, and the new Republic in Turkey 
(Bresser-Pereira 1990, Keyder 1987). Both countries became the epitomes of state 
interventionism for most of the twentieth century: State-owned enterprises were 
established in various sectors, fast-track industrialization became the central goal 
of which the military was the most-committed actor not only with respect to the 
dispersion of a nationalistic discourse, but its control over economic resources and 
complex interactions with the private actors. Accordingly, domestic industry was 
nurtured by the state, as the state-led ISI regime prioritized industrialists in both 
countries, providing them with a broad range of selective incentives and granting 
privileged access to state authorities. The result of such nurturing has been a high level 
of capital concentration and large conglomerates with multi-sectoral investment—as 
the dominant corporate structure within big business. Implicit pacts between the 
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states and industrialists—particularly the large conglomerates—were formed, the 
former providing rents to the latter through personal or organizational contacts; 
and the latter avoiding challenging the regime (Amann & Baer, 2008 Barkey 1990, 
Kingstone 1999) and these pacts were sustained up until the 1980s.  In both Brazil 
and Turkey, the state’s control of societal interests—including those of the businesses--
mostly prevailed as a common practice for decades, but this control was accompanied 
by a tactful use of redistributive strategies, including the formation of large patronage 
networks through which varying degrees and forms of rents were distributed. 
Contrary to the common discourse which depicts the Brazilian and Turkish states 
as strong, I argue that strength tends to be conflated with interventionism and, at 
times, with authoritarianism. Both states suffered from limited capacities throughout 
most of the 20th century, though they maintained heavy interventionism in the 
respective markets. Despite the widespread--and highly effective—distribution of 
patronage, these states could not generally negotiate with the society. I suggest that 
in time, the Brazilian state’s capacity has increased at a much higher degree than that 
of the Turkish state which has kept its interventionism in varying forms coupled with 
authoritarianism, a process which has recently been on the rise (Boschi 2011, Boschi 
and Santana 2012, Ozel forthcoming). Thus, the Turkish state has maintained an 
illiberal character which also shapes the Turkish market economy which is subject to 
enhanced political control despite the three-decades-long liberalization process. 
An overview of economic transformations in Turkey
As in several other middle-income countries including Brazil, state-led 
development in Turkey began in the 1930s and further institutionalized in the 1950s, 
and last until the 1980s. Then, Turkey became one of the first developing countries 
that implemented market reforms in the early 1980s following Chile and Argentina 
which had begun their market transitions in the 1970s. Although the transformations 
are usually referred to as market liberalization, Turkish market economy cannot be 
considered as liberal. The state often intervenes in the market as well as in institutions, 
organizations and actors based on the alleged objective of “enhancing the common 
interest.” Indeed, the Turkish case denotes a large space of intersection between 
patrimonial and statist varieties of the MEs. It entails tensions between institutional 
legacies and the newly transplanted institutions, at times, impairing the effectiveness 
of new institutions. This section will provide an overview of economic transformations 
that the Turkish market economy has gone through in the last three decades. 
The process of economic reforms in Turkey has taken a highly protracted path 
given the legacy of an interventionist-cum-authoritarian state and resistance by the 
existing institutions along with the interests entrenched in those. Interventionism and 
authoritarianism in different forms still affects governance despite the country’s long 
path towards democratization. The excessive use of executive discretion has become 
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common practice since the 1980s, as it was facilitated by the 1982 Constitution, 
which institutionalized the executive’s bypassing the legislature.3 The 1982 
amendments enable the executive “share” legislative power although the 7th Article 
of the Constitution strictly prohibits the delegation of legislative power, exemplifying 
“parliamentarism without a parliament” (Karahanoğulları 1998). Interestingly enough, 
some of the most important rules and policies about economic governance have been 
established by executive decrees since the 1980s, shaping the major turning points 
in the Turkish political economy. Bypassing the existing rules, actors and agents with 
actual or potential capacity for resistance has been a prevalent practice in Turkey and 
it has particularly marked the process of economic transformations since the 1980s. 
The thin base of the pro-reform coalition, particularly in the beginning of reforms, 
along with the available ground provided by the Constitution escorted reforming 
governments into this pragmatic path through which major turning points of the 
Turkish political economy have been shaped through bypassing democratic processes. 
This legacy of short-cut problem-solving includes by-passing the constraints (or 
resistance posed by bureaucrats, politicians, and private actors alike) through making 
new rules and organizations whenever the old ones do not cooperate in a manner 
desired by the executive (Öniş 2004, Ozel 2003 and 2012). Combined with the legacy 
of politicization of bureaucracy, such pragmatism resulted in an oscillating pattern 
between institutionalization and de-institutionalization by a constant change of rules 
and procedures, which has marked the market reform process since the 1980s.  
Antecedents of transformations
Right after Turkey’s launching of state-led development path in the 1930s 
accompanied by increasing authoritarianism, its geopolitical positioning in the 
context of the Cold War brought about the tutelage of the U.S. and the country got 
incorporated into the capitalistic Western bloc as a close ally starting from the 1940s. 
It then became a founding or early member of major multilateral organizations which 
set the post-war international order, the Bretton Woods trio as well as the OECD and 
the NATO. Turkey has also been striving to become a member of the EU for over 
five decades since the 1950s, and accession negotiations started in 2005, while the 
Customs Union Agreement was signed in 1995.
Nevertheless, Turkey’s close alliance with the free market economies of the 
Western bloc did not stop heavy state intervention and market distorting policies and 
practices as price controls, a protectionist international trade regime, and strict barriers 
to international capital movements, at least until the beginning of the 1980s. Turkish 
state-led-capitalism, which had begun in the 1930s, entailed etatism which was placed 
in the Constitution in 1937, giving rise to large state investments which employed 
more than half of the workforce in the late 1970s (Waterbury 1993) besides providing 
cheap inputs and credits for private industry. 
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Akin to Brazil’s experience with ISI, Turkey’s was fairly positive with a high rate of 
growth in GDP (5-6%) until the early 1970s when the resource-dependent-economy 
was severely hit by, first, the oil crises and, then, the debt crisis. These shocks bolstered 
a devastating inflationary cycle and accompanying recession, succumbing the Turkish 
economy into a deep foreign exchange crisis, hobbling its import capacity and causing 
widespread shortages, resulting in a triple-digit inflation rate rising from 20% in 1977 
to 100% in 1980 (Kazgan 2004, Rodrik 1991). Political chaos followed course, resulting 
in an impasse in the parliament that gridlocked the presidential elections in 1979-
80. Socio–political tension was substantial: the country was highly polarized, armed 
groups from the extreme left and right engaged in assaults, assassinations; clashes 
between extremist groups and the state’s security forces intensified, paralyzing 
governments’ attempts at stabilization (Krueger 1995).
A protracted process of transformation
Turkey launched a thorough market reform program in 1980, earlier than many of 
its counterparts in the developing world. It became the poster child of international 
financial institutions (IFIs) until the late 1980s for its pioneering role and the speed 
of the reform process. Then, it took on a lethargic mood in the 1990s succumbing 
into a treacherously-long “lost decade” marked with vicious cycles, resulting in major 
crises in 1994 and 2000-2001, the last being the most severe in Turkish history.4 
Then, it launched another major reform process, this time with a greater effort to 
institutionalize, as following sections will explicate. 
Since the 1980s, Turkish economy has been transformed from a nearly-closed 
economy where rate of openness was 9.1% in 1979 ruled by an interventionist state 
to a hybrid market economy with increased exposure to global commodity and 
capital markets where rate of openness increased to 52.2% in 2008, yet not entirely 
departing some of the characteristics of the previous era.5 Both the institutional 
legacies and the size of the anti-reform coalition made the process a rather protracted 
one marked by major zigzagging where discretionary policy-making, populism 
and de-institutionalization were central (Öniş and Şenses 2009, Ozel 2003, 2010b). 
As the Chart 3 shows, the level of openness in Turkey was lower than in Brazil until 
the 1980s, but it in increased substantially at a much higher rate since then. 
Following the change in the development strategy in the 1980s, income growth 
began to be highly correlated with the exports growth, and such correlation increased 
further in the last decade. Chart 4 demonstrates Turkish economy’s increasing export 
dependency.
In the initial phases of transitions, politicians who encountered with increasing 
political competition usually undermined the necessity of a solid institutional 
framework for reforms. They opted to proceed through bypassing the existing 
institutions based on a short-cut pragmatic stance by means of discretionary tools, 
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Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank
Source: Central Bank of Turkey. 






















































Chart 4. Export-led growth in Turkey, 1987-2010
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leading to liberalization accompanied by de-institutionalization (Öniş 2004, Kalaycıoğlu 
1994). One of the most significant examples of undermining institutional frameworks 
could be observed in privatization process which was initiated and conducted in the 
absence of a legal framework up until the mid-1990s (Atiyas 2009, Öniş and Şenses 
2009). 
1st phase of market transitions: 1980-2000
The milestone of Turkish transformations was the reform program popularly 
known as “January 24 decisions,” a comprehensive policy bundle entailing a wide range 
of liberalization in the areas of financial markets; foreign trade; capital markets; and 
privatization of public enterprises. However, the realization of these ambitious goals 
not only took a long time (some of which, like privatization, have not been completed 
as of now), but their application diverged from initial orthodox rhetoric, since it has 
ended up with a mish-mash of government intervention and populism. Although 
the 1980 package had announced the opening of the Turkish economy to the world, 
the implementation of trade liberalization in its initial phases emphasized export 
promotion rather than overall liberalization, turning de jure Washington Consensus 
into a de facto mercantilism in the initial phases of liberalization. Import liberalization 
gained a new momentum with the initiation of the Customs Union process in 1989. 
Albeit launched in 1985, privatization mostly stalled until the 2000s. 
Resonating Latin America in the 1980s, 1990s are usually referred to as “the lost 
decade” in Turkey since macroeconomic indicators worsened, privatization stalled, 
stabilization efforts stumbled, as expansionary fiscal policies shaped economic policy-
making. Credibility of governments’ policies diminished in this period and populism 
marked the policymaking processes. The critical changes were launching the Customs 
Union agreement with the EU (1995) and the capital account liberalization (1989) in 
the midst of severe instabilities. Usually referred to as “premature” opening (Rodrik 
1991), capital account liberalization enabled arbitrage-seeking short-term capital 
inflows (hot money) and made high interest rates sticky, triggering a process between 
governments (borrowing through GDIs at high interest rates); commercial banks (client 
of GDIs and host of short-term foreign capital inflows); and individual investors (lend to 
commercial banks at extremely high overnight interest rates). Successive governments 
exacerbated a disastrous vicious cycle by increasing indebtedness and interest rates to 
attract “hot money” in order to finance their expansionary fiscal policies and debt. On 
the other side, high interest rates hindered investment because of the skyrocketed cost 
of credits for the real sector. The Turkish economy got into a spiral of high levels of debt, 
interest rates, and inflation along with a new debt crisis where domestic debt mostly 
replaced the foreign debt. In the lure of hot money, the Turkish economy was trapped 
in a vicious cycle of debt and sticky rates of interest and inflation.6 High interest rates 
and inflation impaired investment; public-private competition in the financial markets 
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(and the former’s virtual hegemony in those markets) diminished the availability of 
credits.7 The culprit behind the disastrous spiral was not only the governments which 
financed deficits by further borrowing, but business also contributed by transferring 
its resources to the GDIs and securities, partially facilitating a “rentier-economy” while 
perpetuating clientelistic mechanisms (Köse and Yeldan 1998). Such spiral gave rise 
to three major financial crises emerged in 1994, 2000 and 2001, the latest being the 
deepest in Turkish history.  
2nd phase of market transitions: Post-2001
The 2000-2001 crises became an important milestone in Turkey, bringing about 
major institutional reforms along with macroeconomic stabilization. Political stability 
also followed course as the unstable short-termed coalition governments came to an 
end in 2002, as replaced by a strong one party-government which has recently started 
its third term. In accordance with the “post-Washington Consensus” and emerging 
belief in good governance, Turkish economy has gone through a process of institution-
building and reforming mostly fostered by international and regional actors, such as 
the IMF and the EU, usually referred to as “double anchors” whose conditionalities 
played important roles in policy changes and institutional reforms (Öniş and Şenses 
2009). Turkey’s official candidacy to the EU in 1999 and the launching of accession 
negotiations in 2005 were critical turning points, pushing Turkey to undertake reforms 
to fulfill the Helsinki criteria. Geopolitical considerations also mattered in increased 
funding for the recovery from the crisis which almost coincided with 9/11 attacks in 
the U.S., giving rise to a restructuring of U.S.’ foreign policy with increased importance 
of Turkey, hence, U.S.’ endorsement for the IMF funds. 
Significant institutional and policy changes have been introduced in the post-2001 
governance including the rise of a regulatory state (notwithstanding its adjectives); 
social policy reforms; and fiscal discipline. As regulatory governance was considered 
central in this recent transformation, regulatory frameworks were created and nine 
independent regulatory agencies were established through a so-called “regulatory 
inflation” in a relatively short time span (Ozel and Atiyas 2011).8 Regulatory frameworks 
in some policy areas, including finance and competition, have converged with 
international standards. However, the executive discretion continued to prevail in 
regulated markets as well, marked by high degree of political intervention in ideally—
and allegedly—independent regulatory agencies which regulate the markets. Hence, 
the Turkish regulatory state mostly espouses an illiberal character through prevalent 
use of political control (Ozel 2012 and forthoming). 
Soundness of Turkish banking in the context of the current crisis is brought about 
by such strong frameworks monitored by the Banking Regulation and Supervision 
Agency. The independence of the Central Bank was also significant, playing a central 
role in macroeconomic stability attained after decades (Alper and Hatipoğlu 2009). 
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Fiscal discipline has been a prominent characteristic of this recent phase, not only in 
terms of rule-setting but also rule-implementing. Commitment to limit public debt 
through fiscal prudence is displayed by the enactment of successive fiscal responsibility 
laws. The often acknowledged resilience of the Turkish economy in the context of the 
current financial crisis is mainly provided by regulatory framework and fiscal discipline 
which worked as filters against the crisis. 
Nonetheless, a major paradox prevails here: the invincible Turkish state has 
currently been in the process of hazarding some of the most essential institutions 
executing regulation which facilitated such resilience against the crisis. The rules which 
enhanced the Turkish ME’s capacity to resist against the crisis have been established 
by the regulatory agencies endowed with substantial authority and independence. 
Although the regulatory state which mostly works through independent agencies 
is on the rise throughout the world, the current government in Turkey has decided 
to diminish (even abolish) the independence of those agencies allegedly “for the 
common good”. Regulatory agencies were already subject to increasing levels of—
mostly—de facto political intervention along with the interventions facilitated by 
the de jure changes regarding their independence and authority structures. But, 
an important juncture regarding politicizing the regulatory processes has recently 
taken place: a decree-law was enacted in August 2011 which put forward that “the 
[respective] minister has the authority over all transactions and activities of the related, 
attached and affiliated agencies” which, by definition, include the IRAs.9 Through this 
legal change, regulations as well as other transactions of the IRAs become subject to 
political control, giving rise to a process of de-delegation of authority by the executive, 
concomitant with the pattern of de-institutionalization (Ozel 2012). This shows the 
reluctance of the executive authority to delegate power justified by its desire to 
enhance its capacity to respond more flexibly to the ongoing global crisis It is yet to 
be seen if the governments’ capacity to fight economic crises will increase by means of 
intervening in the regulatory processes. 
Thus, major legacies of the past prevail and endanger the sustainability of 
newly-established institutions. Executive discretion, politicization of bureaucracy 
and deinstitutionalization, which marked the post-1980 transitions still prevail at 
the expense of endangering some of the basic institutions which enabled post-2001 
recovery and resilience against the current global financial crisis (Ozel 2012). The 
Turkish case perfectly exemplifies the tension between the old and the new and how 
reforms might be impaired or sometimes invalidated by previous institutional settings 
and the entrenched interests in those. 
In regards to governance, Turkey still suffers from weak or ineffective institutions; 
corruption persists; informal economy and taxation pose major problems (Öniş and 
Şenses 2009). Even the recent EU accession process and its strict conditionalities has 
not been a panacea for this, because de jure formation and existence of institutions 
in order to fulfill the necessary criteria does not necessarily guarantee their de facto 
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operation. The discrepancies between de jure design and de facto operation of various 
institutions in Turkey can be easily observed regarding rule of law, regulatory quality 
and voice and accountability.10
Additionally, political will to undertake liberal reforms emerged brought about 
by the negative experiences of the crisis, but also coming to power of a new political 
party, the current incumbent, the Justice and Development Party (JDP), self-acclaimed 
“conservative democrats,” who effectively combined their anti-establishment 
stance (particularly against the secularist civilian and military bureaucracy) with 
pro-market ideology, a curious mix generated by the modern Turkish history (Ozel 
2012 forthcoming). JDP is considered to be the political party with highest levels of 
commitment to the ideals of liberal economy, state’s withdrawal from the economic 
realm, even at higher levels than the Motherland Party, the pioneer of market reforms 
in Turkey (Düşkün 2009). Nevertheless, the relatively young JDP’s governments also 
maintained patrimonialist patterns and furthered clientelistic mechanisms by means 
of constructing novel forms of give-and-take with their allies amongst different social 
groups. 
Akin to the Labor Party’s unprecedented rise in Brazil, JDP came to power in 
2002, forming a one-party government following successive coalition governments 
between 1991 and 2002. JDP’s commitment to reforms was more striking in its first 
term (2002-2007) when major institutional reforms were carried out, and stabilization 
was achieved. Before the global financial crisis broke out, Turkish economy was one of 
the fastest growing economies in Europe and the Middle East, as it grew at an average 
rate of 7.2% between 2002 and 2006, when the global liquidity also prepared a suitable 
ground. In fact, the global liquidity boom helped not just Turkey since many countries, 
including Brazil grew at remarkable rates.11 The Chart 5 below displays the changes in 
GDP growth rates in Turkey and Brazil since 1990, indicating that the fluctuations in the 
Turkish economy have been much more drastic than in Brazil, as negative growth rates 
prevailed at the times of the crises in 1994, 2000-2001 and 2008. 
An important issue to underline here is that the “success” of the JDP in terms of 
recovery from the severe crisis (which caused a drastic downturn in Turkish economy, 
signified by 6-7% annual drop in GDP) was mainly based on the programs (particularly 
the “Strong Economy Program”) designed and implemented by the previous coalition 
government.  Yet, presence of a strong base for recovery cannot undermine the 
commitment, and resulting performance of the JDP governments for furthering 
reforms, and stabilizing the economy. Some of the indicators of stabilization were the 
decline in inflation rate (from 35% in 2002 to 6.5% in 2009).12 Since 2002, FDI flows 
increased to an unprecedented level, partially facilitated by effective privatization of 
state owned assets-as explained in the respective section. The growth spurt carried 
out in the first half of the 2000s was partially a recovery from the crisis, and it was 
facilitated by both sound macroeconomic policies and a favorable environment in 
global markets. 















Source: World Development Indicators database, World Bank
Chart 5. GDP Growth in Turkey and Brazil, 1990-2010
Nevertheless, the global financial crisis which emerged in 2007 halted this upward 
trend, when the Turkish economy was far from ready to take such a major challenge. 
It encountered the crisis in a relatively weak position with a high current account 
deficit, low savings rate, and resulting dependency on short-term capital inflows. In 
the presence of such obstacles along with high unemployment and institutional flaws 
particularly with respect to governance, macroeconomic indicators began to worsen 
in the second term of the JDP government (2007-2011). A persistent—and the most 
important—problem facing the Turkish economy is the current account deficit that 
arose from $22.1 billion in 2005 up to $47.7 billion in 2010, constituting 6.6% of the 
GDP.13 Current account deficit increases rapidly during fast growth episodes, and falls 
when the economy slows down, and the deficit has prevailed since the mid-1990s, 
except for the year 2001. Expectedly, the alarming outcome of such expanding current 
account deficit is the dependence on short-term capital inflows which introduces 
considerable volatility to the Turkish market. Chart 6 below displays the recent increase 
in current account deficit. 
Another major issue in Turkish economy is the income gap--albeit at a lower level 
compared to that in Brazil. Although the Gini coefficient based on income, a commonly-
used indicator of the income gap, has declined gradually since the 1990s (from 0.49 
in 1994 to 0.44 in 2002 and 0.40 in 2004), the coefficient based on consumption has 
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Source: Central Bank of Turkey.
slightly increased (from 0.42 in 1994 to 0.43 in 2002). The economic crises in 1994 and 
2000-2001 are considered to have caused the decline in the Gini coefficient, since 
particularly the latest crisis hit higher income percentile significantly.14 Nevertheless, 
cross-regional income gap within Turkey is still striking and growing further. 
Privatization: a thorny road 
Privatization process was launched in Turkey much earlier than in most other 
emerging countries, but its progression has lagged behind those countries (Ercan and 
Öniş 2001). For two decades after its launching in 1985, the cumulative privatization 
revenue only reached $9.4 billion, while it was $5.7 between 1985 and 1999. The 
average annual privatization revenue was about $500-600 million in the 1990s and 
rose up to $8 billion in 2005-2006 (Atiyas 2009: 1, 4). Thus, despite its relatively long 
history, privatization only gained momentum within the last decade, particularly 
after 2004. Additionally, privatization has moved to infrastructure industries such as 
telecommunications and electricity, though the divestiture in some segments of the 
latter is still problematic. Since the year 2000, the cumulative divestiture totalled $37.3 
billion, while the overall total since 1985 is being $ 41.9 billion.15 Some of the giant 
SOEs have been privatized since 2004 including Turkish Airlines, Turkish Telecom, 
Tüpraş (refinery), Erdemir (steel), through the privatization of the last three had been 
launched in the early 1990s, but they were all subject to legal obstacles (and struggles 
later) and strong opposition as they were deemed highly “strategic.” 
 State-owned enterprises had a major share in Turkish economy, particularly in 
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Chart 6. Current Account Deficit in Turkey
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adopted in the 1930s. Between 1950-1960, the SOEs already constituted about 60% of 
total value added in manufacturing, and this ratio went down to 40% at the onset of the 
launching of privatization in 1985, and then further declined to 18.5% in 2000.16 There 
are still SOEs (some to be privatized) and prominent public banks which constitute about 
35% of all actives in the Turkish banking sector (32% in Brazil, 35.5% in Russia).17
One of the major factors behind such protracted implementation was the absence 
of a legal framework for privatization in Turkey, as divestiture of SOEs was deemed 
as a violation against the constitution and the existing legal framework lacked 
coherence as it was complex and disorganized, while the agencies and the rules they 
were subject to changed constantly up until the late 1990s (Atiyas 2009: 2-4). In line 
with the legacy of bypassing existing institutions rather than reforming then, the 
successive governments since the 1980s opted for shortcut solutions to circumvent 
the laws rather than creating a solid legal framework for the privatization process. As 
the previous sections also emphasized, introducing major reforms in the absence of 
establishing necessary institutional changes was a characteristic feature of the first 
phases of Turkish market transition process. 
The argument that “privatization was un-constitutional” was broadly used by 
the anti-privatization coalition, usually led by the opposition parties and statist 
intellectuals. Interestingly enough, all parties from different points in the left-right 
pendulum attacked privatization whenever they were in opposition, but owned 
and promoted it whenever they came to power, indicating the lack of demarcations 
between economic policies across political parties throughout the 1980s and 1990s 
(Düşkün 2009). Starting from the late 1980s, several privatization attempts were 
brought to the Constitutional Court of Turkey by the opposition parties and the 
Court invalidated those cases which had been launched by means of several decree-
laws issued to bypass the legal constraints in a pragmatic fashion. A legal framework 
which thwarted such unconstitutionality of privatization was established in 1994 
by the Privatization Law, No. 4046, setting the principles, procedures, authorised 
agencies and other issues regarding privatization. Following a series of revisions, the 
legal framework was finalized in 1997, and began to contain established rules about 
international arbitration as late as 1999. Later in 2003, an amendment was issued 
to accelerate privatization processes by the Law No. 4971, entitled ‘Law Regarding 
Making Amendments in Some Laws and in the Decrees with The Force of Law Dealing 
with Establishment and Duties of the General Directorate Turkish National Lottery’. 
In addition to the legal constraints, the small size of the pro-privatization coalition 
and accordingly the lack/ inadequacy of a political will to privatize also played a 
role in the protracted nature of the process (Atiyas 2009, Ökten 2006). The broad 
coalition against privatization was not only consisted of workers of the SOEs, but also 
included bureaucrats (not only of the SOEs), public employees, certain segments of 
the intelligentsia as well as the general public (Ercan and Öniş 2001). In this process 
of opposition, the internalized statist ideology was effectively used by the opposition 
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parties for whom the absence of a legal framework provided a large legitimization 
space. The privatization in strategic sectors proved particularly difficult, as has been 
observed in the case of Turkish Telecom whose privatization had been initiated in 
1994, and finalized in 2005. 
The JDP has been the most committed incumbent regarding privatization, 
which can be assessed based on its party programs compared to the others’ since 
the early 1980s (Düşkün 2009). The widespread skepticism toward privatization and 
particularly about divestiture to foreign capital, which have been owned by all parties 
across different ideological stances, has not existed in the case of the JDP whose 
governments have played an important role in changing the prevalent discourse 
against privatization and foreign capital inflows, as the section below demonstrates. 
However, strikingly different outcomes of privatization process in the 2000s can also 
be explained by strong incentives that the JDP governments had to privatize, given the 
rigid fiscal adjustment programmes in the context of the post-2001 conditionalities 
imposed by the creditors (Atiyas, 2009).  
Although the privatization process has not been completed and there are still 25 
companies in the privatization portfolio besides those not included, the state withdrew 
entirely from some sectors such as cement, dairy production, forest products, and 
petroleum distribution, while more than 50% of its shares have been privatized in 
sectors like tourism, iron and steel, textile and sea freight. Interestingly, only a few of 
the public banks have been privatized, whereas some of the largest banks in Turkey are 






























Chart 7. Privatization in Turkey, 1985-2011. 
Source: Privatization Administration, The Prime Ministry of Turkey
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Foreign direct Investment: A novel development in Turkish 
market
One of the most remarkable changes in Turkish economy is the increase in FDI 
inflows since the 2000s partially tied to the recent surge in privatization process. 
Turkey went through an extremely sluggish path regarding the FDI inflows and it 
was identified as a country with low FDI attractiveness throughout the 1990s. It 
received drastically lower inflows compared to BRICs and other emerging countries’ 
averages. For instance, in 1990, both Turkey (684 million USD) and Brazil (989 million 
USD) received less than a million USD FDI inflows, but in 2000, Brazil (33 billion USD) 
received 33 times as much as the FDI inflows into Turkey (1 billion USD).18 Nevertheless, 
there has been a remarkable upward trend in FDI inflows into Turkish market: they 
went up to $10 billion in 2005, catching up with Brazil in 2006 and reaching $22 billion 
in 2007.19 In line with the global trend, FDI inflows showed a substantial decline after 
the emergence of the global financial crisis in 2008, dropping from 18 billion dollars in 
2008 to 9 billion dollars in 2010. At this point, Brazil’s FDI performance is remarkable: 
Although the inflows dropped from 45 billion USD to 25 billion USD between 2008 and 
2009, they recovered to 48 billion USD in 2010. FDI outflows from Turkey also followed 
a similar trend: they declined from 3 billion dollars in 2008 to 2 billion dollars in 2009.20 
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Chart 8. FDI Inflows into Turkey and Brazil, 1980-2010 
Source: World Investment Report, 2011, UNCTAD-WIR
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A significant cause of such discrepancy in the 1990s was the economic and political 
instabilities in Turkey including high inflation, high interest rates and high public 
debt along with unstable political environment in which nine different governments 
came to power. In a business environment where the state crowded out the market 
by becoming the rival of the corporate sector in the financial markets, foreign capital 
hesitated to invest in Turkey. In the existence of such severe instabilities, a protracted 
process of start-stop reforms marked by weak commitments of the incumbents and 
skepticism towards foreign capital fed by populist policy-making curtailed potential 
FDI inflows to the Turkish market. An insolvent and indebted state, chronic inflation, 
credit difficulties, insider credit transactions accumulated and triggered the 2001 crisis 
in Turkey, which provided another backlash against the FDI inflows. Nonetheless, fast 
recovery after the 2001 crisis led to a spurt of FDI inflows. Recent improvements in 
public finances which helped economic stabilization; the EU accession process and 
recent improvements in legal, administrative and regulatory framework (including the 
establishment of the Advisory Council, abolishing Treasury’s authority in providing 
permits, easing the process of starting business); and the privatization programme 
facilitated positive signals to the investors, prompting FDI inflows. 
Social Policy
Social policy and its central institutions went through considerable reforms in the 
last decade concomitant with the reforms in other dimensions fostered by several 
sources, including the EU. In the path of the EU accession process, Turkey has had to 
adopt and implement the acquis of the European Community with respect to several 
areas in social policy, labor market regulations and employment policies (Adaman et 
al. 2007). Recent institutional reforms altered the institutional framework which had 
served since the 1950s. It, in fact, was a highly fragmented framework in the existence 
of three major public institutions: the Public Employees’ Retirement Fund (ES, founded 
in 1950, covering civil servants including the civilian and military bureaucracy); Social 
Insurance Institution (SSK, established in 1964 covering blue collar workers), and 
the Social Insurance Institution for the Self-Employed (Bagkur, established in 1971 
covering the artisans, farmers, voluntarily insured in agriculture and homemakers as 
well as the self-employed) all entailing different conditions for eligibility and benefits. 
This fragmented framework generated significant distributional consequences along 
with fairness issues amongst the contributors (Adaman et al. 2007: 28). 
In 2006, these individual institutions were merged into a new umbrella agency, 
Social Security Institution (SGK), which was established by the Law No. 5502, based 
on the goal of maintaining a financially sustainable retirement, easier access to 
health care and harmonizing eligibility conditions and benefits across beneficiaries 
of the previous institutions. In addition, health and social assistance have been 
separated from retirement benefits. Some of the articles of the reform package were 
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first invalidated by the Constitutional Court and later the law was enacted in 2008 
(Uşan 2009). A parametric reform was introduced in order to decrease substantial 
deficits of the social security system and a healthcare reform was carried out to offer 
universal coverage, currently covering more than 90% of the population.21 A program 
called “Transformation in Health” was introduced in 2003 based on a referral system 
and a health insurance fund integrating functions and collections within the former 
agencies, strengthening the role of the Ministry of Health in provision of health care. 
In the reform process, the share of social expenditures (education, health and social 
protection combined) in the GDP rose from 15.1% to 19% between 1999 and 2006, 
while the budgetary transfer to the Social Security Institution increased from 2.81% of 
the GDP (combined transfers to previous three institutions) in 2000 to 5.56% in 2009.22 
Another important component of recent reforms has been the detachment of social 
assistance from social insurance.
The populist policy making of the 1990s had caused major inefficiencies in the 
social security system, the most important of which being the change allowing 
employees to collect retirement benefits as early as ages 38 and 43 (for women and 
men respectively), after paying contributions for 20 years. Thus, this made the median 
retirement age in Turkey much lower than those in the OECD and other countries. The 
Social Security Act of 1999 (Law No. 4447) first introduced a new scheme to increase 
retirement age to 58 and 60 (for women and men respectively) following a transition 
period of 20 years (amended in 2002) and the 2007 Law (#5502) has complemented 
it by gradually increasing the retirement age further to 65 by 2036 for both men and 
women (Adaman et al. 2007). 
Table 1– Employment Status/ Registration With A Social Security Institution














Overall 19.030 55,1 21.524 52,9 22.594 43,2
Salary/wage  
earner 6.421 17,3 8.385 15,7 13.762 25,7
Daily-waged 998 75,4 1.771 83,7
Employer 961 - 1.139 16,2 1.202 25
Self-employed 5.077 64,3 5.365 68 4.548 68
Non-paid family 
worker 5.573 96,2 4.865 97,7 3.083 92,2
Agricultural 8.735 90,1 8.089 91,8 5.683 85,5
Salary/wage earner 129 57,4 50 36
527 86,3
Daily-waged 297 92,2 306 96,4
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Table 1 (cont.) – Employment Status/ Registration With A Social Security 














Employer 70 - 70 64,3 95 63,2
Self-employed 3.124 79,4 3.332 82,5 2.418 76
Non-paid family 
worker 5.115 98,5 4.331 99,7 2.643 94,7
Non-agricultural 10.295 25,5 13.436 29,5 16.911 29,1
Salary/wage earner 6.292 16,5 8.335 15,6
13.235 23,3
Daily-waged 700 68,4 1.465 81
Employer 891 - 1.069 13 1.108 21,8
Self-employed 1.954 40,2 2.033 44,1 2.129 59
Non-paid family 
worker 458 46,9 534 81,8 440 76,8
Source: Social Security Institution
Despite these changes in the direction of expanding social security expenses 
and schemes, the presence of a large informal sector hazards the availability of social 
security for a considerable portion of the population. The eligibility in most programs 
is based on formal employment, thus, a substantial portion of the workforce does not 
even have access to those except for health. Hence, social networks (including those 
based on religious orders, movements, etc.), family and more extended kinship ties 
provide a broad range of assistance albeit their shrinking state in time (Buğra and 
Keyder 2003). 
The state vis-à-vis capital and labor
State-capital relations and corporate governance
State-capital relations and corporate governance practices in Turkey entail most of 
the characteristics of hierarchical, statist and patrimonial market economies. Indeed, 
Turkey displays striking similarities with its Latin American counterparts including 
that of Brazil in this dimension as highly diversified large conglomerates--mostly 
controlled by families, like the grupos, dominate the Turkish market economy as a central 
characteristic of hierarchical MEs (Schneider 2009). Commonly referred to as “groups”, 
these concentrated conglomerates have access to multi-sectoral investment and 
inter-firm proprietary structures and they are the very products of state-led capitalism 
which explicitly encouraged conglomerates to specialize in distinct fields, partitioning 
the production of consumer products, and acquiring major incentives towards 
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monopolization. Additionally, varying forms of state interventionism in the market 
persist as an important feature of statism; and clientelistic patterns between the state 
actors and businesses continue, signifying the presence of patrimonialism (Becker 2011). 
Although a history of a state-nurtured business in Turkey is similar to those in other 
late-developers including Brazil, Turkish state-led development—coinciding with 
nation-building—began after the business actors of the late Ottoman Empire were 
all but eliminated. Business elements, who had overwhelmingly been constituted of 
non-Muslim elements, were mostly eliminated in the dissolution of the empire at the 
beginning of the twentieth century through wars; the massacre and deportation of 
the Armenian community; and the convention of compulsory population exchange 
between Greece and Turkey in 1923 (Aktar 2006, Gocek 1996). State leaders were 
eager to replace them with a so-called ‘national bourgeoisie,’ which had to be “created” 
from scratch (Keyder 1987). This newly-created business community’s dependence 
on the domestic market exacerbated by a law ruling out the “exit option:” The law on 
Protecting the Value of the Turkish Lira which restricting capital outflows until 1983.
For a business sector that emerged under the auspices of an interventionist state 
was highly dependent on it, the ISI regime and its adjoining arrangements (overall 
an “ISI pact”) were considerably lucrative for several decades. The state’s protectionist 
trade regime; subsidized large population with an inflated purchasing power; a 
repressed financial system with negative real interest rates particularly favoured big 
business and created diverse tools for generation and distribution of rents (Krueger 
1974, Ozel forthcoming). This implicit pact, which ruled in most countries with ISI 
regimes, had another component in the Turkish case: secularism. The alliance between 
big business and the state establishment (including the military) throughout the 
state-led development was based on staunch support for secularism, which remained 
unchallenged until the rise of conservative parties with roots in political Islam and 
the rise of religiously conservative businesses challenging strict secularist practices 
in the 1990s. Commonly referred to as “Anatolian tigers” based on their eager export 
drive, these medium-sized enterprises formed a new alliance with pro-Islamist parties, 
carrying the ruling JDP to power (Ozel 2010a).
Despite the withdrawal of the state from the economy since the 1980s, 
particularistic clientele ties with the firms still prevail in different forms (Onis 1994, Ozel 
2003). Recently, there has been a new layer in such ties that business actors who share 
a common religious identity (individuals and organizations alike) with the incumbent 
JDP might have better access to wide range of resources (Ozel 2012-forthcoming). 
Although processes of market opening were expected to change dominance of 
conglomerates, considered as the very outcomes of the ISI phase, the empirical reality 
has proved this expectation wrong. Adjustment capability of conglomerates to market 
opening was facilitated by their shifting resources across sectors (Ozel forthcoming). 
However, such resilience has not necessarily thwarted increasing competition in the 
Turkish market particularly generated by tigers some of which have recently become 
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giant conglomerates, benefiting from a wide range of selective incentives provided 
by the successive governments that aligned with these newly emerging businesses 
based on various affinities most important of which being the religious identity (Ozel 
2010a). Hence, increased competition has certainly added new players into the market, 
but has not transformed corporate governance structures. 
Insider system in corporate governance
Turkish corporate governance entails characteristics of the “insider system” such 
as few listed companies, large number of substantial share stakes and large inter-
corporate shareholdings, concentrated, mostly-family based ownership and pyramidal 
structure (Yurtoğlu 2000, Ararat and Uğur 2003). Pyramidal ownership structure, 
family control, diversification, high levels of concentration and block-holding as well as 
limited investment in research & development and labor training prevail in the Turkish 
corporate governance practices, akin to hierarchical market economy structures in 
most Latin American countries including Brazil (Schneider 2009). The concentration 
level is very high, as the average percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder 
is 45% in the 100 largest traded companies in Turkey, while 28% have one shareholder 
with an ownership stake of at least 50% and the largest five shareholders hold 64.5% 
on average (Demirag and Serter 2003: 43). Families tend to be the ultimate owners 
in Turkish companies, since they control 68 of the top 94 traded companies, and 37 
of those 68 companies are controlled through pyramids. The pyramidal structure 
has been fostered through incentives such as tax advantages provided for holding 
companies (avoiding double taxation in multiple firms—abolished as late as 1986) 
and transfer pricing mechanisms. Still in line with the Latin American experience, 
Turkish capital market used to be marked by significant problems including low levels 
of capital formation and liquidity, high volatility and high cost of capital, as well as the 
problems related to legal and regulatory framework. 
Turkish corporate governance practices are subject to challenges including 
difficulties regarding enforcement of law and regulations, minority shareholders 
and creditors’ rights; uncertainties arising from legal and regulatory frameworks and 
dismantling privileged oligopolistic coalitions that operate as corporate insiders 
(Ararat and Uğur 2003). The state’s heavy involvement in the market for a long time 
led to the emergence of various rents but also private risks, which then generated 
pressures on the state actors to compensate such risks (Ararat and Uğur, 2003: 64). 
Turkish labor: squeezed between the State and capital 
State-labor relations in Turkey constitute another dimension which makes Turkish 
market economy fit into a hybrid form between statist, patrimonial and hierarchical, 
brought about by limited worker rights and the state’s control over the unions. In 
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fact, as a common strategy since the 1980s, governments in most emerging countries 
have attempted to diminish the political potency of labor unions in the process of 
market transitions, giving rise to different patterns of change in the state’s relations 
with organized labor. While the trend has been toward more fragmentation and 
decentralization, it has been toward more centralization and concentration in the 
Turkish case where the state’s strategy can be characterized by “unite and restrain” 
(Kuş and Ozel 2010). The labor movement which had been strong, but fragmented 
and highly politicized before 1980, was, first, annihilated by the military coup in 1980, 
and it later revitalized in the late 1980s but has never recuperated its power in the 
1970s. Now, not only the unionization rate is much smaller (10% overall public and 
private included, though the figure often announced by the state reaches up to 68%23), 
but also severe limits on unions’ activities along with widespread repression imposed 
both by the state and the capital keep the unions weak. Between 1979 and 2010, the 
number of labor unions in Turkey dropped from 800 to 100 and currently there are 3 
labor confederations.24 The Turkish state created a more centralized union movement 
with fewer players to enhance its control while breaking the power of large unions and 
de-politicizing the union movement. 
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Legacies of authoritarianism in state’s relationship with labor still abound. Despite 
the transition to (semi) democracy in 1983, the 1982 Constitution and the subsequent 
legal changes on the union organization, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts 
mostly institutionalized the state control over the unions. Thus, the 1982 Constitution 
took away most of the labor rights which had been granted by the 1961 Constitution, 
resulting in labor’s becoming a powerful actor in Turkish politics in the 1960s and 
1970s (Mello 2010). 
Most of the changes enacted by the 1982 Constitution are still intact and they 
include rules such that, unions must have the support of at least 10 percent of union 
membership within that industry as well as the 50% at a particular workplace in order 
to represent workers at a given facility. Political strikes, work slowdowns and picketing 
are prohibited and those who strike illegally may be subject to loss of their financial 
claims (including pension, or even their jobs) or imprisonment (Önder 1999). 
Despite increasing state control, unions began to take on a political tone starting 
from the 1990s. The three confederations, namely, Türk-İş, DISK and Hak-İş, and 
independent unions are in rivalry with one another. Most interesting among these 
actors is Hak-İş, a confederation representing a form of unionism based on nationalist 
and religious values and considering the conflict between labor and capital as artificial, 
and, instead emphasizing the commonality of employer and employee interests on 
the basis of Muslim brotherhood (Duran and Yildirim 2005: 231). With its 550 thousand 
members, Hak-İş has been in a close alliance with the successive JDP governments 
since 2002.25 
Cooptation of the union leaders by the state and the capital together with the lack 
of intra-union democracy are prominent characteristics of Turkish union movement, 
which exacerbated further since the 1980s. The workers’ representatives are now 
appointed by the union administration (the only exception being the independent 
“lefty” unions) rather than being elected by the workers which was the practice before 
1980. In this context, the link between the workers and the shop-floor is extremely 
weak and hierarchical structures prevail in most unions, including those represented 
by the allegedly “revolutionary” confederation.  Hence, state-labor relations situate 
Turkey between the statist and hierarchical market economy categories.
In lieu of Conclusion
This article explored the ways in which Turkish political economy has evolved into a 
hybrid form between patrimonial and statist market economies based on hierarchical 
structures. It discussed the formation of an illiberal market economy marked by high 
level of centralization and state interventionism over market players and mechanisms. 
Emphasizing the coexistence of continuity and change through the transformation 
of the Turkish political economy, the article pointed out the tensions between the 
old and the new institutions as well as the interests entrenched in those. It examined 
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10 The Worldwide Governance Indicators, The World Bank Group, 2011, (Note 10) (http://info.worldbank.
org/governance/wgi/index.asp)
11 See: http://databank.worldbank.org 
12 Central Bank of Turkey. http://www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/eng/ Accessed on September 21, 2011. 
13 Sources: Central Bank of Turkey (www.tcmb.gov.tr/yeni/eng/) and World Bank Development Indicators 
(http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators) . Accessed on September 20, 
2011. 
the resistance of some of the former patterns in which the Turkish state interacted 
with the society, while state intervention and patronage distribution has prevailed in 
new forms. The article drew comparisons between Turkey and Brazil in regards to the 
emergence of hybrid varieties of capitalism in the context of transitions from state-
led development to market opening processes. Despite considering both countries as 
constituting hybrid varieties, it purported that, compared to its Brazilian counterpart, 
Turkish market economy was further inclined toward patrimonial and statist varieties, 
 rather than the liberal one.  
Although major institutional reforms were undertaken—mostly under the aegis 
of international and supranational actors—during severe economic crises which 
functioned as external shocks, the article underlined that the effectiveness of newly-
established institutions could be at stake in Turkey, as various actors (most important 
of whom being the politicians, particularly the executive) with various forms of power 
and discretion found the ways of undermining those institutions, spawning constant 
vacillations between institutionalization and de-institutionalization.  
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